Putin’s Red lines
Recent developments point to a clear trend: what Moscow still described as “non-negotiable red lines” just a year ago is now becoming political reality. And not only in Ukraine, but across the entire landscape of relations between the West and Russia.
The events of January 3 in Venezuela and the declaration signed in Paris on January 6 by France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine form a single logical chain—one that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, looks like systematic pressure and political humiliation.
Venezuela: a signal Moscow could not ignore
On January 3, the United States carried out an operation during which Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro was detained. This took place in a region that Russia in recent years had regarded as an important zone of its geopolitical influence and a channel for bypassing sanctions.
For Moscow, Venezuela was not merely an ideological ally. It was:
a hub for energy-related schemes,
political proof that the “bloc of authoritarian regimes” still existed,
a symbol that the United States “would not dare” take direct action.
That illusion collapsed. Washington demonstrated its willingness to act directly, swiftly, and without prolonged diplomatic rituals. And it did so not in Europe, but thousands of kilometers away from Ukraine.
Paris: Europe moves toward hard security
Just days later, in Paris, France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine signed a declaration of intent regarding the possible deployment of multinational forces in Ukraine following a ceasefire or a peace agreement.
It is important to stress: formally, this is not a NATO decision and not a NATO mission. Yet the political reality is evident—the discussion concerns the presence of troops from NATO member states on Ukrainian territory, even if conducted under a coalition framework rather than under the Alliance’s banner.
British and French political leaders openly speak about establishing military hubs, logistical facilities, and security infrastructure in Ukraine after the war. This would mean that any attempt by Moscow to “revise” a ceasefire would automatically carry the risk of direct confrontation with nuclear-armed NATO states.
How the Kremlin sees it
From Moscow’s point of view, this represents the very outcome the war in Ukraine was supposedly launched to prevent. For four years, Russian authorities have claimed that their objective was to stop NATO from moving closer to Russia’s borders.
The result has been the opposite:
Finland and Sweden are now members of NATO,
Western military infrastructure has expanded across the entire eastern flank,
and now a British and French military presence in Ukraine is being planned.
This is not only a strategic blow, but also a personal one for Vladimir Putin, whose power has long rested on the myth of the “strong leader”—the man who defends Russia from the West rather than pushing it into ever deeper isolation.
Why the “red lines” no longer work
Putin’s core problem today is not that the West is crossing the limits he has declared. The problem is that he has fewer and fewer real tools left to force the West to stop.
Open military action against NATO states would mean suicidal escalation. Hybrid measures in Europe no longer shock and are often neutralized. Rhetorical threats increasingly sound hollow—especially after the Venezuelan precedent.
This leaves Moscow with two options:
I. either to “swallow” the new reality and sell it to the domestic audience as a “victory,”
II. or to risk expanding the conflict—something Russia is not prepared for economically or politically.
A path toward a larger war?
Paradoxically, the West’s decision to construct a clear post-war security architecture for Ukraine may reduce the risk of a prolonged conflict. The clearer the rules and deterrence mechanisms, the smaller the temptation to test them.
In the short term, however, tensions are unavoidable. Each such step will be portrayed by Kremlin propaganda as an existential threat, increasing the risk of impulsive decisions.
One thing is already clear: for Russia, 2026 did not begin with the triumph of “red lines,” but with their quiet erosion.
Author: Dalius Andriukaitis
Article prepared for the news portal Lietuvosvalstybe.com