Lithuanian project TAURUS 4
In recent weeks, serious — though not yet fully verified — reports have been circulating in the public space, suggesting that local initiatives in Lithuania could face political and economic pressure as a result of intellectual property claims or commercial disputes.
Specifically, the TAURUS 4-1 project, developed by the “Aurida Engineering Company” based in Panevėžys, has attracted international attention and sparked heated debates over technological similarities and intellectual property issues. This alone represents a risk to a project of national importance.
Even sharper statements are being heard in public discussions: some sources claim that the IP claims are being made by companies or interest groups linked to South Africa — a country belonging to the BRICS bloc. Such circumstances raise concerns that international disputes could be used as instruments of geopolitical pressure or lobbying that is unfriendly to Lithuania.
It must be emphasized that these are publicly voiced claims that require careful verification. South African companies (e.g., Paramount Group) consistently deny any ties with aggressor states and, in some cases, have won legal actions against false accusations.
A Serious Signal to Lithuania’s Authorities
The mere fact that such claims are circulating — and that there are several public disputes and legal processes between international defense industry players — should be seen as a serious warning to the Lithuanian government.
This is not the time for “optical accounting” in Lithuania’s defense budget. What’s needed are independent checks, transparent audit procedures, and political will to ensure that local manufacturers are not left vulnerable to geopolitical and lobbying intrigues.
The state must publicly clarify whether there have been any lobbying or intermediary actions that may have favored foreign interests at Lithuania’s expense.
If Lithuania’s defense industry — such as Aurida Engineering Company — is developing products with breakthrough potential, but state institutions succumb to hostile narratives or manipulations, then this becomes not only an economic issue, but also a national security threat.
5.38% of Lithuania’s GDP Allocated to Defense in 2026
The Prime Minister announced that Lithuania’s defense budget for next year will amount to 5.38% of GDP (approximately €4.79 billion), with part of the funds directed towards military infrastructure and defense-related projects.
However, Lithuanian Armed Forces Commander General Raimundas Vaikšnoras warned that such “patchwork budgeting” — when part of the funds are distributed through other ministries — may create a nice statistical picture, but not real security.
“We won’t fight with paving stones,” he said, criticizing plans to allocate a portion of “defense” funding to local infrastructure projects.
This is more than rhetoric. Lithuanian leaders agreed back in January that between 2026 and 2030, 5–6% of GDP should be allocated to defense, but what truly matters is not the percentage itself — it’s how the money is spent: how much actually goes to air defense, drones, radars, and ammunition.
Criticism of “Defense Make-Up”
Criticism of this so-called “defense make-up” stems from the lack of proper management and oversight. The story of the National Stadium has become symbolic of how public money can “burn” for years without any tangible results.
If a similar scenario repeats with Lithuania’s defense budget, the result will not be a strong military — but a beautifully paved illusion.
Increasingly, questions are being raised in the public sphere about foreign influence mechanisms, PR campaigns, and information operations that could discredit local defense initiatives.
Such issues must be handled transparently, publicly, and responsibly, otherwise the information war may be lost before the radars are even switched on.
What Needs to Be Done?
Clearly earmark defense budget allocations — distinguish what is actually spent on military equipment and what goes to civilian projects.
Strengthen public procurement and auditing mechanisms in the defense sector — independent reporting and transparency are crucial.
Prioritize real defense capabilities: air defense, drones, radars, ammunition, and soldier equipment — not sidewalks and paving stones.
Support local defense industry, which creates added value and reduces dependency on imports.
General Vaikšnoras’ words are not mere criticism but a warning: figures may look impressive, but if the budget is spent on asphalt instead of ammunition, the state does not grow stronger — it sinks into defense make-up.
If Lithuania wants real security, it must invest not in paving stones — but in what it will actually fight with when the “X Day” comes.
Lietuvosvalstybe.com
Newspaper Editor: D.A.
When quoting or disseminating information from lietuvosvalstybe.com, the source of the information must be cited.