A conclusion based on intelligence assessments
This is not a political statement, nor an emotional reaction. It is a cold, sober conclusion based on publicly available intelligence assessments—one that decision-makers in Lithuania and across the Baltic region must hear now.
The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, has openly and unambiguously stated what many have previously only hinted at: Russia is accelerating its timeline for potential aggression against the Baltic states. While Moscow’s planning once revolved around a 2030 horizon, today the year being discussed is 2027.
This is not “leaked” information. It is a deliberately issued warning. And it means one thing: the strategic clock is no longer ticking in years, but in months.
Why Budanov’s words matter
Budanov is not a politician and not a commentator. He speaks from direct knowledge of Russian planning documents, doctrines, and operational behavior. His message is simple and consistent with history: the Kremlin shortens timelines when it senses weakness—or opportunity.
Do the Baltic states still have time?
Until recently, the internal logic of Russia’s security apparatus assumed the Baltic states had “time” until 2030, given fragmented preparedness and slow decision-making. That assumption is now collapsing.
Moscow sees that the Baltic countries possess the technical, financial, and political capacity to prepare much faster. And paradoxically, that is the most dangerous moment. Historically, Russia does not strike when an adversary is already strong—but when it is in the process of becoming strong.
The greatest threat today is not tanks. It is delay.
The war is already underway—systemically
This must be stated clearly: Russia’s war against Lithuania has already begun. Not kinetically, but systemically.
It manifests through delays in defense projects, endless “procedural” bureaucracy, artificially created legal grey zones, discrediting campaigns against the defense industry, and pressure disguised as “transparency” that in reality produces paralysis.
This is classic hybrid warfare logic: if you cannot ban something—slow it down; if you cannot stop it—make it so costly and time-consuming that the state exhausts itself.
The key question, therefore, is not whether we allocate enough money. The real question is whether that money turns into weapons in time.
2026 is the final threshold
If by the end of 2026:
there are no functioning ammunition production capacities,
counter-drone and air defense systems are not deployed at scale,
real stockpiles do not exist at brigade level,
and the defense industry is not protected from hybrid sabotage,
then in 2027 we will not be fighting a “modern” war. We will fight with whatever remains in warehouses.
At that point, talk of “NATO plans” will become secondary—because the first weeks of any war are always borne by those who are already on the ground.
Why defense alone does not prevent war
Here lies a fundamental error that must be corrected: defense alone does not create deterrence.
Trenches, minefields, drones, and air defense are necessary—but insufficient. Without offensive firepower (deep fires)—long-range strike capabilities that can destroy enemy logistics, reserves, and command nodes before they reach our territory—a state remains passive and eventually exhausted.
When does deterrence actually work?
Deterrence works only when the aggressor knows that an attack will not merely be stopped, but pushed back.
Defense + counterstrike = security
Defense alone = defeat over time
Why this matters to allies—and to Ukraine
There is another decisive factor that is often left unspoken: allies make decisions based on risk.
Countries like Ukraine do not provide support based on emotion. They assess whether local resistance has real counterstrike potential. No one will act if they see a suicidal commitment to a situation already lost.
This is why offensive capabilities are not a tool of escalation, but a catalyst for solidarity. They give allies confidence that their support will be effective—not a futile sacrifice.
Only when we reach the level where we can not only hold the line, but seize the initiative, does real space for allied action emerge.
What must be done now—without compromise
First, the defense industry must be declared a strategic national security sector, with exceptional procedures—not “eased rules,” but true exemptions.
Second, projects related to ammunition, drones, air defense, explosives, repair, and recovery must be assessed using wartime logic—not public procurement formalism.
Third, bureaucracy must be treated as a threat. Delayed decisions require clear personal accountability for lost time.
Fourth, the defense industry must be actively protected from informational and legal attacks. This is a counterintelligence issue, not a “business climate” debate.
Fifth, deep fires capabilities must be fully integrated—C2, ISR, logistics, and stockpiles—together with air defense and counter-UAS systems, as a single operational system.
A final, uncomfortable truth
Will Vladimir Putin ever set foot in the Baltic states?
He will not—when he sees not promises, but factory lights burning at night, warehouses filled with reserves, and an army that can fight today, not five years from now.
If today we choose to “take it easy,” “wait,” or “discuss a bit more,” we will wake up in a different reality—not metaphorically, but literally. History has already seen this. And it was not called “independent Lithuania.”
There is no time left to sleep.
The only question is whether we wake up now—or are awakened later, already living under a different system.
When warnings converge from multiple fronts
Today I am also sharing a personal message I received from my long-time partner in Ukraine—a close friend and battalion commander. This is not a political text and not fearmongering. It is a message from someone who lives in war, addressed to Lithuania.
Act now. Unite today. Together, we can withstand any threat.
This is not a call for panic. It is a call for unity and timely action. Wars often begin not when everything is perfectly prepared, but when the aggressor sees delay, division, and a loss of confidence.
We still have time.
But it can no longer be wasted.
Author: Dalius Andriukaitis
Article prepared for the news portal: Lietuvosvalstybe.com